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Politicians across the country, seeking to address a growing sense of 
political and social alienation from communities of color and their allies, have 
scrambled to introduce reforms to police departments and police investigative 
agencies that promote accountability and transparency.  Body cameras,1 special 
prosecutors,2 inspectors general,3 and new internal accountability procedures4 
have all been broadcasted as political efforts towards reform.  This Article 
addresses what impact these political maneuvers—which all work within the 
same executive branch as the police—have without routine judicial scrutiny of 
 
* Cynthia Conti-Cook is a staff attorney in the Special Litigation Unit of The Legal Aid 
Society.  Many thanks for editing and insights to William D. Gibney, Steve Wasserman, 
Davim Horowitz, Professor Steven Zeidman, Professor Jocelyn Simonson, and Adam 
Yefet. 
 1  See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 31 (2015), 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.  
 2  See Governor Cuomo Signs Executive Order Appointing NYS Attorney General as Special 
Prosecutor in Cases Where Law Enforcement Officers Are Involved in Deaths of Civilians, N.Y. 
STATE, https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-executive-order-
appointing-nys-attorney-general-special-prosecutor-cases (last visited Apr. 22, 2016).  
 3  See About NYPD Inspector General, NYC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oignypd/ 
pages/about/about.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).  
 4  The New York Police Department (NYPD) announced its Risk Assessment Unit 
in March of 2015.  See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE NYPD, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF 
INVESTIGATION, USING DATA FROM LAWSUITS AND LEGAL CLAIMS INVOLVING NYPD TO 
IMPROVE POLICING (Apr. 2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/oignypd/ 
assets/downloads/pdf/2015-04-20-litigation-data-report.pdf.  See also Shawn Cohen, 
Jamie Schram & Bob Fredericks, NYPD Cops May Be Stopping Too Few Out of Fear of 
Discipline: Monitor, N.Y. POST (July 9, 2015, 1:06 PM), 
http://nypost.com/2015/07/09/nypd-cops-may-be-stopping-too-few-out-of-fear-of-
discipline-monitor/; Colleen Long, NYPD Tracking Officer Data on Lawsuits, Complaints, 
AP (July 11, 2015, 11:51 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ 
3d421711089b4658862f34ebd181073e/nypd-tracking-officer-data-lawsuits-
complaints; Benjamin Weiser, Record Number of Claims Filed Against New York Police a Year 
Ago, a Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/08/28/nyregion/record-number-of-claims-filed-against-new-york-police-a-year-
ago-report-says.html?_r=0. 
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misconduct in the courtroom.5  Without consistent and rigorous judicial review, 
they have none.  Without defense attorneys armed with sufficient information 
and resources to initiate judicial review, they have none.  But defense attorneys 
have been blocked from petitioning for judicial review by statutory laws that 
protect police records from public disclosure and even from disclosure to defense 
lawyers in court.  In response to these challenges in New York, the Legal Aid 
Society has employed a new database to collect police accountability data to 
expand its opportunities to advocate for scrutiny of officers in the courtroom and 
in the public sphere.6 
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 5  For a discussion on the limits of police policing themselves, see Joanna C. 
Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 CHI. L. F. (forthcoming 2016).  
 6  It is important to note that defenders’ offices across the country are often 
inadequately funded and are barely able to address their case loads, let alone take on 
a project like The Legal Aid Society’s.  Arguments for additional funding for defense 
organizations could include defenders’ distinct role in pushing judicial review of 
police reform and therefore employing a necessary vehicle for police accountability.  
“We can change laws designed to govern how police, prosecutors, and judges do their 
jobs, but if we do not adequately support public defenders so that they can point out 
when the rules are broken, violations will go undetected.”  Jonathan Rapping, Public 
Defenders Key to Reducing Mass Incarceration, TALKPOVERTY (Oct. 28, 2015), 
http://talkpoverty.org/2015/10/28/public-defenders-key-reducing-mass-
incarceration/.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
What we have made of our police departments [in] America, what 
we have ordered them to do, is a direct challenge to any usable 
definition of democracy.  A state that allows its agents to kill, to beat, 
to tase, without any real sanction, has ceased to govern and has 
commenced to simply rule.7 
 -Ta-Nehisi Coates 
 
As residents of New York City (NYC) wait for the Department of 
Justice to indict Officer Daniel Pantaleo for the death of Eric Garner, 
we still have no information about what evidence was presented to the 
Richmond County Grand Jury,8 nor do we know whether the New York 
Police Department (NYPD) or other NYC agencies knew of and failed 
to address prior substantiated misconduct by Pantaleo.  More 
importantly, we do not know enough about the extant disciplinary 
systems that seemingly failed to flag, correct, and address earlier 
misconduct.  Could New York City, through a rigorous and meaningful 
disciplinary system, have prevented Mr. Garner’s death if it had 
addressed any prior misconduct?  It is more so the City’s culpability 
through systemic accountability failures, and less Pantaleo’s individual 
aggression, that should interest the public. 
In contrast, the citizens of Chicago, among other cities, when 
confronted with the shooting of Laquan McDonald, were able to 
instantly question both the officer’s behavior and the strength of 
police disciplinary systems as they learned that the shooting officer, 
Jason Van Dyke, had twenty prior civilian complaints.9  Van Dyke and 
Chicago officials alike shared the responsibility for McDonald’s killing.  
In contrast to the behavior of New York Police Department 
Commissioner, William Bratton, the Chicago Police Commissioner 
resigned.10  Would New Yorkers demand the same if we learned about 
 
 7  Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Paranoid Style of American Policing, ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/illegitimacy-and-
american-policing/422094/.   
 8  The Legal Aid Society also petitioned for release of the grand jury minutes from 
the Garner grand jury.  Eugene Volokh, N.Y. Appellate Court Refuses to Order Release of 
Eric Garner Grand Jury Materials, WASH. POST (July 29, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/29/n-y-
appellate-court-refuses-to-order-release-of-eric-garner-grand-jury-materials/. 
 9  Eliott C. McLaughlin, Chicago Officer Had History of Complaints Before Laquan 
McDonald Shooting, CNN, (Nov. 26, 2015, 5:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/ 
11/25/us/jason-van-dyke-previous-complaints-lawsuits/. 
 10  Bill Ruthhart & David Heinzmann, Emanuel Dismisses Top Cop Garry McCarthy 
Amid Pressure for Change, CHI. TRIB., (Dec. 2, 2015, 6:35 AM), 
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failures in our disciplinary system that hypothetically allowed an officer 
to have prior cases of excessive force and still be in a position to take 
Mr. Garner’s life with a prohibited chokehold?  At the moment, we do 
not know because New York Civil Rights Law section 50-a (hereinafter 
“section 50-a”)11 has been invoked to protect Daniel Pantaleo.  In truth, 
it has only protected the NYPD and city officials from the type of 
scrutiny and accountability directed toward the Chicago officials.12  
This Article is about how The Legal Aid Society has tried to take this 
accountability gap into its own hands by litigating New York “Freedom 
of Information Law” (FOIL) and also by designing a smartphone app 
for defense attorneys based on defender-driven police accountability 
data. 
Part II of this Article examines how, despite the strong historical 
role the judiciary has played in checking police misconduct, vigorous 
judicial review in New York has been prevented by section 50-a, which 
protects police records from disclosure to defense attorneys13 and the 
public.14  Section 50-a undermines the role of judicial review as a 
“check” on an executive officer’s powers and impedes the 
constitutional rights of the accused to effectively confront witnesses.  
An accused’s constitutional rights to confrontation, fair trial, and due 
process have been effectively trumped by a statutorily created right that 
shields from review anything New York police departments label 
“personnel records,” including, some argue, disciplinary records.  This 
is despite the fact that numerous state and federal courts have rejected 
the argument that officers have a constitutional right to privacy in 




 11  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2016). 
 12  See infra Part II.A. 
 13  This Article interchangeably refers to criminal defense attorneys as “defense 
attorneys” and “defenders.” 
 14  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a. 
 15  See Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D. 226, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“Privacy interests are 
diminished when the party seeking protection is a public person subject to legitimate 
public scrutiny.  Performance of police duties and investigations of their performance 
is a matter of great public importance.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Cassidy v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 377 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) 
(“The conduct of a policeman on duty is legitimately and necessarily an area upon 
which public interest may and should be focused . . . . [T]he very status of the 
policeman as a public official, as above pointed out, is tantamount to an implied 
consent to informing the general public by all legitimate means regarding his activities 
in discharge of his public duties.”).  Recently, the South Carolina Court of Appeals 
expressly rejected an attempt by a sheriff’s deputies to invoke a constitutional right of 
privacy with respect to an internal investigation into their discharge of official duties, 
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Part III of this Article briefly visits American colonial history to 
remind ourselves how the previous “ruling” government’s abusive 
policing tactics inspired the Revolution and the Fourth Amendment.  
Following the historical evolution of the constitutional principles of 
“checks and balances” and “separation of powers,” and how that 
framework built our modern jurisprudence for judicial review of police 
misconduct, the Article discusses why the courts have failed to 
influence police misconduct and what role section 50-a plays in 
preventing meaningful judicial review. 
Finally, Part IV of this Article introduces the Cop Accountability 
Database created by The Legal Aid Society of New York City.  This 
database was created to address the obstacles section 50-a poses to 
criminal defense attorneys, specifically to their ability to litigate police 
misconduct in the courtroom, thereby preventing judicial review.  The 
database seeks to enhance judicial review of routine abusive executive 
overreach by police by giving defenders easier access to information 
collected from clients, daily investigations, and the wealth of collective 
institutional knowledge defenders already have. 
II. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW SECTION 50-A: A LAW DESIGNED AS AN OBSTACLE 
TO PUBLIC AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF POLICE MISCONDUCT 
Defenders are prevented from presenting evidence that would 
prompt judicial review of police misconduct in many cases because a 
few states have instituted heightened scrutiny before access is allowed 
to police records either through FOIL requests or court-ordered 
subpoenas.  New York’s barriers to public access are paralleled by only 
two other states in the scope of information the government argues is 
exempt from disclosure.16  New York Civil Rights Law section 50-a, 
 
which was found to constitute “conduct unbecoming an officer,” resulting in 
suspension without pay.  Burton v. York Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 594 S.E.2d 888, 891, 896–
97 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit found that “police internal 
investigation files [are] not protected by the right to privacy when the documents 
relate[] simply to the officers’ work as police officers.”  Stidham v. Peace Officer 
Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1155 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (finding police officer who was subject to suspension and reprimand for on-
duty conduct did not have “a legitimate expectation of privacy” because the 
information was not “highly personal or intimate”).  “Individual expectations of 
confidentiality must arise from the personal quality of any materials which the state 
possesses.”  Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1571 (10th Cir. 1989).   
 16  See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the City of New York’s recent interpretation 
of section 50-a to include summaries of substantiated on-duty misconduct.  See also 
Robert Lewis, Noah Veltman & Xander Landen, Is Police Misconduct a Secret in Your 
State?, WNYC (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.wnyc.org/story/police-misconduct-
records/.  Note that only two other states, California and Delaware, have laws that 
specifically make police personnel records “confidential.”  Similar to New York, 
CONTI-COOK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2016  12:57 PM 
1068 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1063 
promulgated in 1976, provides that “all personnel records used to 
evaluate continued employment or promotion, under the control of 
any police agency . . . shall be considered confidential and not subject 
to inspection or review without the express written consent of such 
police officer . . . except as may be mandated by lawful court order.”17  
Section 50-a was crafted in reaction to FOIL and, as discussed later in 
this Article, the growing powers accumulating in the judicial branch to 
review police misconduct. 
A national movement for open government gained momentum 
following Cold War secrecy, Watergate, and the Nixon 
administration.18  While New York’s first FOIL was passed in 1974, it 
was not expanded until 1977 to include access to all public records, 
making exemptions the exception rather than the rule in order “to 
open the processes of government to ready review by the public and to 
balance that indispensable availability of public access with the 
interests of efficiency in governmental operations and protection of 
individual rights.”19  The expansion sought to “achieve the greatest 
magnitude of openness in government without sacrificing personal 
and privileged information” to “help instill in the citizens of the state 
greater trust and confidence in the governmental institutions which 
are playing an increasingly important role in our daily lives.”20  It is 
because of FOIL that, for example, a public train engineer’s 
 
California requires civil and criminal litigants to make Pitchess motions to gain access 
to police disciplinary records.  See Pitchess v. Super. Ct., 522 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1974).  The 
standard for New York under section 50-a is higher than California, which only 
requires “good cause” to obtain in camera review.  New York litigants, in contrast, must 
present a good faith factual predicate to warrant judicial review for information that is 
“relevant and material” to the case.  Compare N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a(2) & (3) and 
Dunnigan v. Waverly Police Dep’t, 719 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (App. Div. 2001), with CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 1043(b)(3) (West 2016).  For decades prior to 2006, California police 
oversight agencies, including San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Oakland, voluntarily 
made their police disciplinary records public.  See Frequently Asked Questions about Copley 
Press and SB 1019, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION N. Cal. (June 15, 2007), 
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/frequently-asked-questions-about-copley-press-and-sb-
1019 (discussing the case of Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court 141 P.3d 288 (Cal. 2006), 
which extended confidentiality to records of police oversight agencies).  Delaware’s 
exemption for personnel records is limited to disclosures that would constitute an 
“invasion of privacy” under state and federal law, which is arguably narrower than New 
York’s unrestricted “personnel records used to evaluate performance,” yet has 
followed New York law in requiring a factual predicate that records are relevant prior 
to judicial inspection.  Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1024 (Del. 1996) (quoting 
People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d 924, 928 (N.Y. 1979)).  
 17  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a. 
 18  History of FOIA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/ 
transparency/history-of-foia (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).  
 19  “Mem. Of Sens. Marino, Anderson, et al.,” Bill Jacket L 1977, ch 933.  
 20  “Letter from Sen. Marino,” Bill Jacket L 1977, ch 933. 
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disciplinary records and the reasons he was fired are discussed openly 
on the radio.21 
It is without question that police officers, more than any other 
government official, interact with the public in life-changing ways every 
day.  They patrol the streets armed with numerous lethal and non-
lethal weapons.  They regularly initiate contact and interrupt people’s 
daily routines with broadly defined discretion that is often 
unchallenged and generally only results in litigation if an arrest is 
made.22  Yet at the same time the expansion of FOIL was passed in 1977, 
a broad exception was carved out for police records.  This applied to 
public access requests and especially to subpoenas sought by defense 
attorneys in the context of criminal cases.  This broad protection from 
subpoenas for police records reversed twentieth century courts’ 
increasing power to review police misconduct that will be discussed in 
Part III. 
According to a report by the Committee on Open Government in 
December 2014 and an in-depth series in 2015 by a New York public 
radio station, WNYC, “no other state provides the unique protection 
afforded [to police officers in New York] in [section] 50-a.”23  Why has 
New York become so protective of its police records, even substantiated 
on-duty misconduct and even in the context of a court proceeding?  
 
 21  Robert Lewis, Xander Landen & Noah Veltman, New York Leads in Shielding 
Police Misconduct, WNYC (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.wnyc.org/story/new-york-leads-
shielding-police-misconduct/.  
 22  The NYPD interact with an estimated twenty-five million civilians over the 
course of one year.  John Podhoretz, The Numbers Add Up to One Fact: Cops Are a Blessing 
to NYC, N.Y. POST (Dec. 31, 2014, 12:26 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/12/ 
31/the-numbers-add-up-to-one-fact-cops-are-a-blessing-to-nyc/.   
 23  COMM. ON OPEN GOV’T, STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
GOVERNOR AND STATE LEGISLATURE 3–5 (Dec. 2014), http://www.dos.ny.gov/coog/ 
pdfs/2014AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter N.Y. ANNUAL REPORT]; Lewis, Veltman & 
Landen, supra note 16.  Police internal affairs records and citizen complaints are 
“mostly unavailable” from FOIL disclosure in twenty-three states, but only considered 
“confidential” by statute in two other states (California and Delaware).  See Lewis, 
Veltman & Landen, supra note 16.  Records are more accessible in fifteen states 
depending on whether severe discipline resulted from the misconduct.  Id.; see also ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-a, § 503 (2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.7(B)(4) (West 
2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-301(3)(o)(i) (West 2007) (exempting formal charges 
of misconduct until and unless the charges are sustained and the action is complete).  
Texas’s statute makes internal affairs documents relating to deadly force public.  It 
exempts internal affairs documents that determine the officer did not engage in 
misconduct, and it makes public the documents where disciplinary action is decided.  
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 143.1214, 143.089 (West 2015).  In twelve states, these 
documents are public record in most circumstances.  Many state statutes are vague.  
See Jenny Rachel Macht, Should Police Misconduct Files Be Public Record? Why Internal 
Affairs Investigations and Citizen Complaints Should Be Open to Public Scrutiny, 45 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 1006 (2009). 
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The legislative history of section 50-a reveals a heavy lobbying effort by 
police unions and district attorneys, seeking specifically to prevent 
defense attorneys from impeaching officers by prior bad acts in the 
courtroom.24  Prior bad acts are those that courts have said generally 
demonstrate “an untruthful bent or significantly reveals a willingness 
or disposition . . . voluntarily to place the advancement of his individual 
self-interest ahead of principle or of the interests of society.”25  The 
letters in support of the 1977 legislation, however, characterize 
impeachment with prior misconduct as “harassment.”26  Other than a 
strong letter by the New York Civil Liberties Union pointing out that 
the accused has a constitutional right to meaningful confrontation of 
witnesses, including impeachment of officers, there was very little 
opposition.27 
 
 24  See, e.g., Letter from William G. Connelie, NYPD Superintendent, to unknown 
recipient (June 8, 1976); Letter from Sanford D. Garelik, Chief of NYC Police for the 
Transit Auth., to Frank Padavan, N.Y. Sen. (Apr. 20, 1976); Letter from John Maye, 
Chairman of Patrolmen’s Benevelent Ass’n, NYC Transit Auth. Police Dep’t , to Hugh 
L. Carey, N.Y. Governor (June 18, 1976); Letter from Mario Merola, Dist. Att’y of 
Bronx Cty., to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to N.Y. Governor (June 7, 1976); Memorandum 
from Al Sgaglione, President of Police Conference, to unknown recipient (June 14, 
1976); Letter from Thomas R. Sullivan, Dist. Att’y of Richmond Cty., to Judah Gribetz, 
Counsel to N.Y. Governor (June 9, 1976).  All sources in this footnote are included in 
the 1976 N.Y. Governor’s Bill Jacket, available from the Legislative Secretary to the 
New York Governor’s Counsel.  
 25  People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 461 (N.Y. 1994).  
 26  Bill Jacket L 1977, ch 933 at 6 (“This bill would afford some protection to police 
officers who must testify in criminal proceedings.”); Id. at 11 (“[O]fficers are bearing 
the brunt of fishing expeditions by some attorneys who are subpoenaing personnel 
records in an attempt to attack the officer’s credibility.”); Id. at 13 (“[T]his bill is 
directed at purported abuses involving the indiscriminate perusal of police officers’ 
records by defense counsel in cases wherein the police officer is a witness.”); Id. at 19 
(“I am not aware of the fears expressed by some prosecutors that these records, if 
available, could be misused by defense counsel in criminal litigation, in order to 
muddy the issues at hand.”); Id. at 20 (“It has been brought to my attention that, often 
simply as a harassment tactic, defense attorneys in criminal cases have been making an 
unrealistically high number of requests for personnel files of police officers.”); Id. at 
21 (“In the past, counsel has sought the personnel records of police officers for 
unwarranted fishing expeditions.”); Id. at 23 (“The purpose of this bill is to insulate 
policemen from meaningful cross-examination in cases in which they are witnesses.”); 
Id. at 29 (“The purpose of the Act is to restrict a defendant’s ability to subpoena the 
personnel files of prospective police officer/witnesses.”).  
 27  See Letter from N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union, to N.Y. State Senate (May 24, 1976).  
See also Letter from Michael R. Juviler, Counsel to the Office of Court Admin., to Judah 
Gribetz, Counsel to the Governor (June 8, 1976) (writing that the Office of Court 
Administration would take “no position”).  Joseph P. Hoey, Special Deputy Attorney 
General and Special Prosecutor to Suffolk County, did oppose.  Letter from Joseph P. 
Hoey, Special Deputy Att’y Gen., N.Y. Dep’t of Law, to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to the 
Governor (June 18, 1976) (“[T]he need for public accountability of public servants is 
becoming painfully clear.  On the Federal level, the movement towards increasing the 
public availability of secret law enforcement files has greatly accelerated in the past few 
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Court cases interpreting section 50-a fall into two separate 
categories: (1) public access cases interpreting disclosure 
requirements under the FOIL; and (2) cases applying heightened 
scrutiny to requests for subpoenas by attorneys during pending 
criminal or civil litigation.28  In both scenarios, section 50-a presents 
serious obstacles to the public, to defense attorneys, and to judges, 
thereby blocking judicial review of police misconduct. 
A. Public Access Cases 
The last time the Court of Appeals reviewed public access to 
police disciplinary records under FOIL was in In re Daily Gazette Co. v. 
City of Schenectady.29  In that case, the local daily paper of a medium-
sized city, Schenectady, New York, sought the identities of eighteen 
officers involved in off-duty misconduct and the full file pertaining to 
their discipline following a drunken off-duty brawl during a bachelor 
party.30  The court’s holding in Daily Gazette expressly left room for 
directing disclosure in response to a “restrictive formulation” that 
“would not undermine the protective legislative objectives.”31  The 
Second Department of New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division 
in Cook v. Nassau County Police Department analyzed the tension between 
section 50-a and Public Officers Law section 87 (FOIL), holding that a 
summary of an investigation file was sufficiently “limited to the extent 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of Civil Rights Law § 
50–a to prevent the potential use of information in the records in 
litigation to degrade, embarrass, harass, or impeach the integrity of the 
officer.”32 
Following Cook, the NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board 
(CCRB), for a time, regularly disclosed summaries of officers’ records 
 
years.  The proposed legislation represents a significant step in the opposite 
direction.”).  All sources cited in this footnote are included in 1976 N.Y. Governor’s 
Bill Jacket, available from the Legislative Secretary to the New York Governor’s 
Counsel.  
 28  See infra Part II.A–B.  
 29  In re Daily Gazette Co. v. City of Schenectady, 710 N.E.2d 1072, 1073–74 (N.Y. 
1999).  
 30  Id.  
 31  Id. at 1078; see also In re Capital Newspapers Division of the Hearst Corp. v. 
Burns, 496 N.E.2d 665, 669–70 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that agency was required to 
disclose the material requested by reporter who sought a one-month record of sick 
leave requests from named officer); but see In re Fink v. Lefkowitz, 393 N.E.2d 463, 471–
72 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that agency was not required to produce specialized 
investigative techniques of nursing home industry that would potentially compromise 
pending investigations).  
 32  Cook v. Nassau Cty. Police Dep’t, 972 N.Y.S.2d 638, 638 (App. Div. 2013).   
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in response to FOIL requests, many of which came from Legal Aid 
Society attorneys.  Yet in September 2014, following the disputed 
termination of former Executive Director Tracy Catapano-Fox,33 the 
CCRB, citing section 50-a, stopped its practice of disclosing summaries 
even for cases involving substantiated on-duty misconduct.34  This is an 
overly broad interpretation of section 50-a’s already broad protection 
of police records.  Even the spokesperson for the Schenectady police 
union distinguished off-duty from on-duty misconduct: 
[T]hey have a greater need for protection from the publicity 
of their off-duty conduct.  We do not seek to hide all police 
activities behind a shroud of secrecy . . . . I think the 
distinction we want to make for these Schenectady officers is 
that this was not connected to their duties to the public.35 
Nevertheless, the City of New York argued in In re Luongo v. Records 
Access Officer (“Luongo I”) that Daily Gazette protects all police 
disciplinary records from disclosure.36  Judge Alice Schlesinger granted 
The Legal Aid Society’s request that the CCRB disclose a summary of 
Officer Pantaleo’s substantiated on-duty misconduct and any resulting 
administrative penalties on two separate grounds: (1) the summary 
requested is not a personnel record under section 50-a; and, even 
assuming it is such a record, (2) the CCRB failed to established “a 
substantial and realistic potential of the requested material for the 
abusive use against the officer.”37  The City has appealed and the matter 
 
 33  Thomas Tracy, Joseph Stepansky & Stephen Rex Brown, Civilian Complaint 
Review Board Covers Up NYPD Misconduct, Turns Blind Eye on Sexual Harassment Within 
Board: Suit, DAILY NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014, 11:54 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
news/politics/civilian-complaint-review-board-bed-nypd-suit-article-1.1965556.  
 34  See, e.g., Letter from Tracy Catapano-Fox, Exec. Dir., CCRB, to author (Aug. 20, 
2014); Letter from Tracy Catapano-Fox, Exec. Dir., CCRB, to Jennifer Saint-Preux, 
Legal Aid Society (Sept. 17, 2014); Letter from Brian Krist, Assistant Deputy Exec. Dir. 
Of Investigations, CCRB, to Joel Schmidt, Staff Att’y, Legal Aid Society (Nov. 10, 2014); 
Letter from Lindsey Flook, Assistant Deputy Exec. Dir. of Investigation, CCRB, to 
Robin Gordon-Levitt, Staff Att’y, Legal Aid Society (Nov. 14, 2014); Letter from 
Lindsey Flook, Assistant Deputy Exec. Dir. of Investigation, CCRB, to Alejandra Lopez, 
Staff Att’y, Legal Aid Society (Oct. 29, 2014); Letter from Lindsey Flook, Assistant 
Deputy Exec. Dir. of Investigation, CCRB, to Diana Nevins, Staff Att’y, Legal Aid 
Society (Nov. 14, 2014); Letter from Lindsey Flook, Assistant Deputy Exec. Dir. of 
Investigation, CCRB, to Juliette Noor-Haji, Staff Att’y, Legal Aid Society (Nov. 14, 
2014); Letter from Lindsey Flook, Assistant Deputy Exec. Dir. of Investigation, CCRB, 
to Ariel Schneller, Staff Att’y, Legal Aid Society (Nov. 14, 2014).  All letters cited in 
this footnote are on file with author. 
 35  Laura Suchowolec, Court of Appeals Decision Rekindles Debate on Records, DAILY 
GAZETTE, Apr. 11, 1999, at B-01.  
 36  In re Luongo v. Records Access Officer, Civilian Complaint Review Bd. (Luongo 
I), 15 N.Y.S.3d 636, 642–43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).  
 37  Id. at 643–44.  
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is still pending.38  In January 2016, a second judge adopted Judge 
Schlesinger’s reasoning in another case demanding disclosure of a 
summary of CCRB records, finding that the “requested summary is 
statistical in nature and would not detail the circumstances that led to 
the complaints or content thereof.”39 
While the disciplinary summaries have not yet been released 
pending appeal, these cases have prompted attention from various 
editorial boards to the secrecy that the New York statute affords police 
officers.40  Discussing the Luongo I decision, the New York Times 
Editorial Board pointed “to the distressing fact that New York’s 
disclosure law gives the public far less access to information about 
police officers than workers in virtually any other public agency.”41  AM 
New York’s Editorial Board concurred: 
New Yorkers have a right to know when officers are accused 
of transgressions, and what inquiries find.  It’s true whether 
videos capture the action or not, whether citizens are dead 
or merely mistreated.  A law that keeps such information 
from the public is a travesty, and must be changed.42 
That the public has the right to access officers’ on-duty misconduct 
records is the law in twelve states.43  There is no evidence that officers 
in those states are any less safe or any less capable of testifying in court 
to defend their arrests than officers in New York. 
 
 
 38  See Ben Bedell, Board to Appeal Cop Records in Fatal Garner Encounter, N.Y. L. J. 
(Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202735886020/Board-to-
Appeal-Cop-Records-in-Fatal-Garner-Encounter?slreturn=20160303145717.  
 39  In re Luongo v. Records Officer, Civilian Complaint Review Bd. (Luongo II), 
No. 7617/2015, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 19, 2016) (Purificacion, J.) (citing In re 
Capital Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Burns, 67 N.Y.2d 562 (1986) (permitting 
disclosure of number of days and dates on which certain named officers were absent 
from their scheduled employment)).  
 40  See, e.g., Editorial, A Law That Hides Police Misconduct from the Public, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/opinion/a-law-that-hides-
police-misconduct-from-the-public.html; Editorial, Cop Misconduct Shouldn’t Be Kept 
Secret, NEWSDAY (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.newsday.com/opinion/editorial/cop-
misconduct-shouldn-t-be-kept-secret-1.10825198; Editorial, Eric Garner Case Shows Why 
Police Secrecy Law Is Wrong, AM N.Y. (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.amny.com/opinion/ 
editorial/eric-garner-case-shows-why-police-secrecy-law-is-wrong-1.10825265 
[hereinafter Eric Garner Case]; Editorial, Stop Hiding Police Misconduct in New York, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/opinion/stop-hiding-
police-misconduct-in-new-york.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Stop Hiding]. 
 41  Stop Hiding, supra note 40.  
 42  Eric Garner Case, supra note 40.  
 43  For a discussion about national public access laws as they pertain to police 
disciplinary records (and bodyworn camera footage), see Cynthia Conti-Cook, Open 
Data Policing, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2016). 
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New York legislatures have recently embraced the need to adjust 
section 50-a.  New York State Senator Kevin Parker introduced a bill 
that would narrow the definition of “personnel records.”44  While the 
proposed amendment is subtle, it may work towards removing 
independent oversight agencies’ records from the “personnel record” 
definition.45  More directly, on March 15, 2016, Assemblyman Daniel 
O’Donnel introduced legislation that would repeal section 50-a 
because “the evolution of § 50-a has defeated [FOIL’s] goal of 
accountability and transparency.”46 
B. Heightened Scrutiny for Subpoenas of Police Records in Criminal and 
Civil Litigation 
Even more troubling than New York’s strict public access 
protections for police records are the almost equally strict protections 
for police records in court.  Section 50-a places the burden on the 
defense attorney to obtain, and not the prosecutor to disclose, 
impeachment material based on police disciplinary records.47  The 
CCRB and NYPD also routinely oppose defense motions in criminal 
courts across New York City for subpoenas based on disciplinary 
 
 44  See S.B. S4808, 2015-2016 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), https://www.nysenate.gov/ 
legislation/bills/2015/s4808 (“AN ACT to amend the civil rights law, in relation to 
personnel records of police officers, firefighters and correction officers[.]”).  This 
recommendation to the legislature was first made by the Committee on Open 
Government Annual Report, December 2014.  N.Y. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23.  
 45  Luongo I and Luongo II courts both found that whether CCRB records are 
covered under section 50-a is an open question.  
 46  See Memorandum from N.Y. State Assemb. in Support of Assemb. B. A09332, 
2015-2016 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016), http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn 
=A09332&term=2015&Summary=Y&Memo=Y.   
 47  See Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files 
and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 778 (2015) (discussing 
the reversal of burdens for disclosing police records).  
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information to prevent48 or limit49 disclosure to the accused in criminal 
cases, also relying on section 50-a.  Their arguments seek to prevent 
disclosure of the documents to the defense and even oppose in 
camera50 review by the courts.  This process directly prevents the 
defense from pursuing an effective cross-examination and defending 
its theory of the case.51  For example, in one case the arresting officer 
 
 48  See People v. Cook, 27 N.Y.S.3d 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (denying defense 
application for CCRB and NYPD records predicated upon civil litigation against 
subject officers); People v. Zagaja, No. 227/2015 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Sept. 17, 2015) 
(denying Gissendanner application predicated upon prior civil litigation involving 
named police officer); People v. Barrie, No. 2014KN003219 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. July 10, 
2015) (denying defense application for CCRB and NYPD records of principal witness); 
People v. James, 46 Misc. 3d 1219(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (denying defense 
application for CCRB records); People v. Hernandez, No. 2013KN086748 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. Oct. 22, 2014) (quashing defendant’s subpoena seeking CCRB and any disciplinary 
records pertaining to named officer under section 50-a); People v. Rodriguez, 46 
Misc.3d 1220(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (“The fact that federal lawsuits were filed against 
the officers here is not a factual predicate warranting review of their personnel files.”); 
Letter from Brian Krist, Assistant Deputy Exec. Dir. Of Investigations, CCRB, to Hon. 
Jaqueline Williams, J. of N.Y. Fam. Ct. (Jan. 29, 2016) (urging the court to issue a 
written decision reflecting the court’s decision from the bench in In re Monge, No. D-
64/15 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sept. 29, 2015), wherein the court denied a motion seeking 
disclosure of CCRB records).  But see People v. Oriol, No. 2744-14 (N.Y. Crim Ct. 2015) 
(ordering in camera inspection based upon evidence of settled prior civil litigation 
alleging similar misconduct).   
 49  For cases requiring limited disclosures, see, for example, People v. Fleetwood, 
No. 1179-2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015) (ordering the CCRB and NYPD to turn 
over records of substantiated misconduct of named officer for in camera review 
because the defendant has sufficiently demonstrated the pertinence of his past 
misconduct to the facts of this case and his credibility, but otherwise granting NYPD 
and CCRB’s motion to quash); Luongo I, 15 N.Y.S.3d 636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) 
(ordering production of limited statistical and dispositional information concerning 
substantiated complaints pursuant to FOIL) (order stayed pending appeal); People v. 
Wesley, No. 4362/14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2015) (granting protective order shielding 
all but CCRB’s final report and audio or video recordings concerning prior 
substantiated complaints against subject officer or the incident at issue from 
production for in camera inspection); People v. Brown, No. 2383/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
May 6, 2015) (following motion to quash, issuing Gissendanner orders to CCRB limited 
in camera inspection of only CCRB’s final reports and audio or video recordings 
concerning subject officer).  But see People v. Bledsoe, No. 02200-2014 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
Nov. 23, 2015) (denying application seeking in camera inspection of prior 
substantiated complaint against subject officer when no showing had been made that 
it could be relevant to the facts at issue in the prosecution); People v. Calderon, 48 
Misc.3d 1226(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 3, 2015) (determining from the bench that, 
following Wesley, there is no material to be provided from the restricted CCRB records 
to the defendant in response to subpoena); People v. Cook, 27 N.Y.S.3d at 329. 
 50  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2016).  Section 50-a requires judges to 
review police personnel records in camera, or privately without either party’s input, to 
determine what might be relevant to the case. 
 51  See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 459 (1995) (information about a key 
informant’s criminal conduct was among the evidence deemed to be Brady material, 
even though it was unrelated to the case); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 43 
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was on “force monitoring”52 at the time of the arrest, which resulted in 
injuries to the accused.53  Defense counsel theorized that the officer 
then arrested the accused on charges of being drunk and violent in 
order to cover up yet another incident of force that could further 
jeopardize his already tenuous career status due to multiple instances 
of prior force complaints.  In this case, because of Legal Aid’s database 
described in Part IV below, The Legal Aid Society knew about, and 
presented to the judge, prior Brady disclosures that confirmed that the 
officer was on “force monitoring” at the time of the arrest and had at 
least one substantiated CCRB complaint.  The court still declined to 
sign the subpoena—blocking not only the defense attorney’s ability to 
pursue a cover up theory with evidence of the officer’s motive to 
protect his career but even blocking the court’s own in camera review 
of that material. 
The reason why judges are holding subpoenas of police officer 
misconduct to a heightened standard of scrutiny is because section 50-
a requires that the accused  “put[] forth in good faith [a] factual 
predicate which would make it reasonably likely that the file”54 could 
contain “information, which, if known to the trier of fact, could very 
well affect the outcome of the trial.”55  Disciplinary records of a police 
witness are relevant and material to a criminal proceeding if their 
contents “carr[y] a potential for establishing the unreliability of either 
the criminal charge or of a witness upon whose testimony it depends.”56  
As one judge remarked, this standard should not be interpreted too 
strictly so as to not “require the defense to know the precise contents 
 
(1987) (defendant’s Brady request for child abuse records “related to the immediate 
charges” as well as earlier records stemming from a “separate report” of defendant’s 
abuse); Abel, supra note 47, at 754 (describing the case of United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97 (1976), wherein undisclosed evidence was a murder victim’s criminal record, 
which was not drawn from the particular case).  
 52  NYC Comm’n to Combat Police Corruption, A Follow-Up Review of the New 
York City Police Department’s Performance Monitoring Unit 7 (2006), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccpc/assets/downloads/pdf/A-Follow-up-Review-of-the-
NYPDs-Performance-Monitoring-Unit-April-2006.pdf (“To be placed on Chronic 
Force Monitoring, an officer must have been found guilty of one set of charges and 
specifications involving force in the previous five years or been the subject of two or 
more substantiated force, abuse, discourtesy, or offensive language complaints in the 
previous four years.  For an officer to be placed on Chronic Discipline Monitoring, he 
must have engaged in some form of serious misconduct resulting in a disciplinary 
penalty including the forfeiture of at least twenty vacation or suspension days.”).  
 53  Pending criminal matter on file with author.  Details of the case cannot be 
disclosed as of the time of this writing. 
 54  People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 550 (1979).  
 55  Id. at 548.  
 56  Id. at 550; see also People v. Shakur, 648 N.Y.S.2d 200, 203–04  (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1996).  
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of the very file it is seeking [therefore] putting the cart before the 
horse.”57  This is because, “[i]n the usual case, a party seeking discovery 
will, of course, not know precisely what pertinent information is within 
a personnel record; thus, a strict reading would render the statute 
meaningless.”58 
But some judges, like the one described above, do interpret 
section 50-a strictly despite an accused’s potential constitutional rights 
to such disclosures.  Professor Jonathan Abel notes that police 
personnel records “[fall] into [a] doctrinal crack insofar as it is 
generally not related to any specific case” but still subject to disclosure 
by prosecutors pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and subsequent cases 
extending Brady to impeachment material.59  Yet New York judges 
routinely bar defense attorneys from directly accessing this material 
with section 50-a, relying precariously on prosecutors to disclose 
misconduct. 
Predictably, prosecutors have not proactively assumed their “duty 
to learn” about officer misconduct and, as a result, misconduct often 
goes undisclosed to the defense.60  Across the country, prosecutors 
have inconsistently reacted to their duties to discover and disclose 
misconduct of police officers —a duty they cannot be expected to 
pursue given the conflict of interest in prosecutors investigating the 
misconduct of the officers they rely on.61  An expectation of 
prosecutors to police the police is also inconsistent with the 
constitutional framework of checks and balances between the 
executive and judicial branches discussed below in Part III.  
 
 57  People v. Jackson, 655 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (App. Div. 1997) (defense made a 
sufficient showing that the officer had been suspended on at least one prior occasion 
to warrant in camera inspection); accord Estate of McConlogue v. Cty. of Nassau, 208 
A.D.2d 888, 889 (App Div. 1994) (requiring “good faith showing of some factual 
predicate”); Becker v. City of New York, 556 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (App. Div. 1990) 
(holding that plaintiffs were “merely required to offer, in good faith, ‘some factual 
predicate’”). 
 58  Cox v. New York City Housing Auth., 482 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6–7 (App. Div. 1984) 
(police personnel records are relevant and material to a negligent hiring and 
retention claim); see also People v. Morales, 412 N.Y.S.2d 310, 315–16 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
1979) (sufficient showing by defendant to warrant in camera inspection when police 
officer was main witness, defendant asserted officers initiated contact and 
independent witnesses supported that defense). 
 59  See Abel, supra note 47, at 754; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) 
(announcing prosecutor’s duty to learn); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985) (plurality opinion) (eliminating requirement for defense to request 
impeachment material); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) 
(expanding Brady to impeachment material). 
 60  Abel, supra note 47, at 779.  
 61  Id. 
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Prosecutors nationwide have failed to create systems for accessing and 
disclosing police misconduct due to the joint interest of prosecutors 
and local police departments in “executing” criminal and penal law.  
This failure precisely demonstrates why the founders of the 
Constitution sought balance through separate branches of 
government. 
Without reform of section 50-a and more routine judicial review, 
recent policing reforms, such as special prosecutors, inspector 
generals, or body cameras, will not be effective.62  Section 50-a reverses 
the access and power courts were meant to have in order to exercise 
meaningful judicial review over executive overreach.  The next section 
of this Article discusses the history of judicial review of police 
misconduct to demonstrate how section 50-a undermines the rule of 
law and destabilizes executive power by preventing judicial review. 
III. RESTORING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF POLICE MISCONDUCT, THE 
“TRADITIONAL RESPONSIBILITY” OF THE JUDICIARY 
Courts’ constitutional duties under the separation of powers have 
historically included checking the overreach of police officers and 
other executive branch officials.63  This is primarily influenced by the 
abusive and arbitrary policing tactics suffered during the colonial era 
at the hands of the royal authorities.64  Indeed, scholars of the 
 
 62  See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949) (describing administrative and 
political alternatives to routine judicial review of police misconduct that could be 
effective if functional accountability systems and transparency were in place), overruled 
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  See also supra notes 1–5 regarding recent 
reforms. 
 63  See Scott E. Sundby, Everyman’s Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary Rule and the 
Rule of Law (or Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule), 10 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 393, 402 (2013). 
 64  Boston lawyers James Otis Jr. and Oxenbridge Thacher argued in 
Massachusetts’ highest court that invasive police searches were contrary to the 
“fundamental principles of law,” and spearheaded a legal dispute over “writs of 
assistance.”  MERRILL JENSEN, THE FOUNDING OF A NATION 76–77 (Hackett Publ’g 2004) 
(1968).  Such writs were the colonial equivalent of search warrants, and after King 
George II’s death required customs officers in the colonies to renew applications for 
the writs, Boston merchants initiated legal challenges to the re-issuance of the writs for 
the first time in colonial history arguing both that they were overly broad on their face 
and that they were abusively enforced.  Id.  While they were unsuccessful in the 
courtroom and the writs were re-issued over their objection, John Adams, as a young 
lawyer observing from the gallery, referred to the event as the birthplace of “the Child 
of Independence.” Id. at 1371 (quoting NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
59 (Da Capo Press 1970)).  Understanding Otis’s arguments opposing “writs” is 
“essential to understanding one reason for the colonists’ growing political alienation 
from the home government during the Great War for Empire.”  ALAN ROGERS, EMPIRE 
AND LIBERTY 102 (1974).  “[A]n article appeared in the Boston Gazette outlining the 
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American Revolution “widely accept[] that colonial disputes with royal 
authorities over [search warrants] contributed both to the Revolution 
and the Fourth Amendment’s inclusion in the Bill of Rights.”65  Rather 
than entrust the executive branch with policing itself, the judicial 
branch, which “will always be the least dangerous to the political rights 
of the Constitution,”66 was naturally deemed responsible for 
scrutinizing the misdeeds of police, “at least since the time of Marbury 
v. Madison” in the context of criminal proceedings.67  As Professor Scott 
Sundby, discussing the evolution of the “exclusionary rule”68 as a 
judicial remedy for constitutional violations, wrote: 
The exclusionary rule as a manifestation of the rule of law is 
also abundantly evident in how the Court viewed the 
exclusionary rule as necessary to carry out its constitutional 
duties under the separation of powers.  The importance of 
the exclusionary rule in aiding the judiciary to serve its 
constitutional role as a check on executive and legislative 
overreaching was very much on the minds of the Supreme 
Court in recognizing the exclusionary rule.69 
 
 
dangers writs of assistance held for all Englishmen.  If the writs were issued, the writer 
warned, all Americans would be enslaved.  Property rights and political rights would 
be subject to the arbitrary interpretation of a petty government official.”  Id. at 103.  
The court’s decision, granting these overly broad sanctioned abuses of power made 
“[e]very one with this writ . . . a tyrant; . . . in a legal manner.”  JAMES OTIS, AGAINST 
WRITS OF ASSISTANCE (Feb. 1761), reproduced in NAT’L HUMAN. INST., 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2016).  Otis’s 
argument against writs of assistance eventually became “institutionalized” in the 
Fourth Amendment.  J. L. Bell, The Writs Were Ordered to be Issued, BOSTON 1775 (Feb. 
24, 2011), http://boston1775.blogspot.com/2011/02/writs-were-ordered-to-be-
issued.html; see also J. L. Bell, The Press Response to the Writs of Assistance Argument, 
BOSTON 1775 (Feb. 25 2011), http://boston1775.blogspot.com/2011/02/press-
response-to-writs-of-assistance.html.   
 65  Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law 
History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 10 (2007).  See also Potter 
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1983) (“The 
framers sought to ensure that the newly formed federal government could not employ 
the two devices used by the British Crown that they believed jeopardized the liberty of 
every citizen: the general warrant and the writ of assistance.”) (citation omitted).  
 66  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), http://www.constitution.org/ 
fed/federa78.htm#2.  
 67  Stewart, supra note 65, at 1368; id. at 1384 (citing Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 
137 (1803)). 
 68  While the first judicial application of the Fourth Amendment in 1886 was not 
in the context of a criminal case, by 1925, “the annexation of the exclusionary rule to 
the fourth amendment-was basically complete.”  Id. at 1372–77. 
 68  Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).  
 69  Sundby, supra note 63.  
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In Wolf v. Colorado, decided in 1949, the United States Supreme 
Court hesitated extending the exclusionary rule to the states and 
thereby instituting routine judicial review of all police misconduct.70  
This hesitation was grounded in the Court’s general deference to the 
state governments’ “other methods” to identify and prevent 
misconduct, including internal capacity to investigate and police 
themselves, as demanded by the democratic process and deterred by 
costs of damages in civil law actions.71  The Court, however, noted the 
ability of such “internal discipline of the police” depended on the “eyes 
of an alert public opinion” and “consistent enforcement.”72  The 
subsequent overruling of Wolf in 1961 by Mapp v. Ohio73 signaled the 
Court’s recognition that state and local police departments were 
unable, or unwilling, to police themselves through the “other 
methods” discussed in Wolf.74 
From 1961 to 1968, the judicial remedy of the exclusionary rule 
expanded.  Beginning in the early 1960s through the present, courts 
have entertained and employed arguments grounded in cost-benefit 
analyses of whether excluding such evidence would deter future police 
misconduct.75  Multiple judicial decisions considered how to 
incentivize police officers away from abusive police practices, 
abandoning Wolf’s deference to the “alternative” methods.76  In 1968, 
the Supreme Court further widened the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment to protect citizens not only in their homes, cars, and 
businesses, but also during police street encounters in Terry v. Ohio, 
finding that “wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 
 
 70  Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31. 
 71  Id. at 31–32. 
 72  Id. at 31.  See also Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: the Role 
of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2010) 
(police officials do not have sufficient access to information about police misconduct 
described in lawsuits to respond usefully); Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from 
Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 847 (2012) (stating that “[m]ost police departments 
ignore lawsuits”).  
 73  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“[W]ithout the [exclusionary] rule the 
assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be ‘a form of 
words,” valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable 
human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy 
would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the 
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court’s high 
regard as a freedom ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”).  
 74  Stewart, supra note 65, at 1388–89 (discussing the limitations of the 
“alternatives” to the exclusionary rule). 
 75  Id. at 1391 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)).  
 76  Id. at 1392 (relying on Supreme Court cases to show that the exclusionary rule 
has been applied differently depending on the circumstances).  
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‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from unreasonable 
government intrusion.”77  Chief Justice Warren then declared it a 
judge’s duty to review police misconduct, calling it a “traditional 
responsibility,” and charged that when misconduct is identified, “it 
must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded 
from evidence in criminal trials.”78 
In addition to the application of the exclusionary rule to the 
states, one other significant legal development in the early 1960s 
promised to transform judicial review of police misconduct: the 
Supreme Court held that if one could not provide his own criminal 
attorney, the state was required to provide one for him.79  With more 
people represented by counsel, one might think it would result in 
more police behavior being scrutinized. 
How, then, have courts influenced police misconduct by judicial 
review?  Considering the broad power courts have to review police 
misconduct, the strong judicial remedy of the exclusionary rule, and 
the uptick in attorneys scrutinizing police encounters, one might 
assume police misconduct quickly waned.  But the opposite has 
happened.  In New York City alone, mayoral commissions, the killing 
of numerous New Yorkers (the majority of whom were people of 
color), bar association reports, civil rights lawsuits, city council 
hearings, media reports, whistleblower officers, and mass protests have 
exposed the pervasive nature of police misconduct for the past forty 
years.80  In 2005, Professor Steven Zeidman examined how “judges, 
court administrators and prosecutors—promote justice by actively and 
critically monitoring or overseeing the police,” and concluded that 
“the dearth of jury verdicts, . . . [and] few determinations of the 
constitutionality of the police officers’ probable cause to stop, search, 
and arrest” has resulted in “virtually unfettered, unchecked police 
activity and discretion.  Once an officer makes an arrest, it is for all 
intents and purposes insulated from any meaningful challenge or 
review.”81  Indeed, only an estimated two percent of all national arrests 
are dismissed due to suppressed evidence.82 
 
 77  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
351 (1967)).  
 78  Id. at 15.  
 79  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).  
 80  Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 320–22 (2005). 
 81  Id. at 315, 321. 
 82  Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the 
“Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 8 AM. BAR 
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 611, 611 (1983) (reporting that 2.35% of felony arrests in 
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In August 2013, in a 198-page decision, District Judge Shira 
Scheindlin invoked Wolf in holding the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy 
unconstitutional and finding evidence of widespread constitutional 
violations: “‘The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to 
a free society.’  Far too many people in New York City have been 
deprived of this basic freedom far too often.”83  Routine police 
violations spiked in 2011 with 685,724 stop-and-frisks—”a 600 percent 
increase since Raymond Kelly took over as NYPD Commissioner in 
2002.  Eighty-four percent of those stopped were Black or Latino, and 
[eighty-eight] percent of the people stopped were neither arrested nor 
received summonses.”84 
How is it that more than forty years after the U.S. Supreme Court 
extended the exclusionary rule to allow state judges to review police 
street encounters and public defenders started standing with each 
person accused of a crime, we still live in a society plagued by police 
misconduct?  What stands in the way of routine judicial review having 
an impact on policing? Professor Zeidman named several obstacles, 
including the spike in low-level arrests and a reluctance to litigate the 
police conduct leading to those arrests, problem-solving courts and 
their institutionalized deference to police, judicial and prosecutorial 
tolerance for police perjury, lack of discovery disclosures, and 
institutional pressures to plea as early as arraignments.85 
All of these obstacles certainly contribute to routine judicial 
review having an impact on policing, but when we consider that section 
50-a was passed in 1976, on the heels of courts becoming empowered 
to routinely review police encounters, it is clear that law enforcement 
agencies and unions specifically intended to maintain secrecy 
surrounding police misconduct and thwart any efforts by the courts or 
defense attorneys to pierce their secrecy.  Their efforts explicitly 
targeted defense attorneys’ ability to confront police witnesses with 
evidence of prior misconduct in the courtroom, therefore bringing 
 
California are “lost” because of exclusionary rule).  
 83  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)), appeal dismissed, No. 13-3524 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 
2013). 
 84  Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Landmark Decision: Judge Rules 
NYPD Stop and Frisk Practices Unconstitutional, Racially Discriminatory (Aug. 12, 
2013), https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/landmark-decision-
judge-rules-nypd-stop-and-frisk-practices#.  
 85  Zeidman, supra note 80, at 316–18 (spike in low level arrests); id. at 321–22 (lack 
of litigation in misdemeanor cases); id. at 324–26 (judicial tolerance of police perjury); 
id. at 330 (pleas at arraignments); id. at 339–41 (problem solving courts); id. at 346–
47 (discovery); id. at 348–49 (prosecutorial tolerance of police perjury). 
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that misconduct into the public eye.86  These efforts are antithetical to 
the rights of the accused to confront witnesses, to a fair trial and due 
process, and also to the balance of powers between the judicial and 
executive branches as a result of the overwhelming power police 
unions and district attorneys hold in the legislative branch. 
The remainder of this Article focuses on how The Legal Aid 
Society, by collecting and organizing the collective institutional 
knowledge of its clients, investigators, and lawyers, has created a 
searchable database in order to reinvigorate judicial review of police 
misconduct. 
IV. THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY’S COP ACCOUNTABILITY DATABASE 
Section 50-a’s dual public access restrictions and heightened 
subpoena standard prevents defense attorneys from being able to 
provide fully effective assistance of counsel: to give clients informed 
advice about the weight of the case against them, the risks at trial, and 
the value of a plea offer.  In an era when plea bargaining disposes of 
the majority of cases and it takes years before an accused will be able 
to confront police officers in court, it is even less likely that Brady 
disclosures will even surface.87  Even if a client chooses to risk trial, New 
York’s discovery laws allow prosecutors to withhold evidence and 
witnesses’ names until the day of trial and attorneys might have an 
evening to prepare impeachment.88  Faced with the reality that many 
of the officers dragging the Society’s clients into bookings89 have 
 
 86  It is also worth noting that neither the courts nor the prosecutors have 
historically reported misconduct when it is discovered in a court process.  For example, 
when an officer has been discovered to have violated an accused’s rights, leading to 
the suppression of evidence, that officer’s supervisor never learns of that outcome and 
is not able to take any corrective behavior.  While an officer’s arrest record has 
historically been counted towards promotion, whether the officer’s arrests are thrown 
out in suppression hearings is not typically counted.  At Seton Hall Law Review’s 2016 
Symposium, Policing the Police and Community, there was some discussion of 
conversations with the local prosecutors’ offices developing to improve these gaps, 
however there has not been anything publicly discussed.  
 87  Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose 
Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3602 
(2013) (“In 2009, 97 percent of federal convictions and 94 percent of state convictions 
were obtained through guilty pleas . . . . However, a dispute remains regarding whether 
a defendant may challenge a guilty plea for the prosecution’s suppression of material 
exculpatory evidence.”).  
 88  See John Schoeffel, Criminal Discovery Reform in New York: A Proposal to Repeal 
C.P.L. Article 240 and to Enact a New C.P.L. 245, LEGAL AID SOC’Y 2 (2009), 
https://www.legal-
aid.org/media/156626/criminal_discovery_reform_in_new_york.pdf.   
 89  Central bookings is the detention area where people are brought before 
arraignments in New York City. 
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histories of misconduct, lawyers at The Legal Aid Society began 
keeping handwritten lists of officers they knew had engaged in 
misconduct.  This has now evolved into a much larger database project 
with potential public policy implications. 
In 2014, The Legal Aid Society announced the Cop Accountability 
Project—anchored by a database for police misconduct—intended to 
serve its clients, its attorneys, and the community.  For the past year, 
the database has expanded from excel spreadsheets to an SQL cloud-
based relational database available to attorneys (in early 2016) on their 
mobile devices.  Using police misconduct data, the Society has already 
won release for its clients at arraignments, had cases dismissed before 
trial, obtained adjournments in contemplation of dismissal (ACDs) 
and other favorable dispositions, and successfully impeached officers 
on the stand.90  For example, in a felony case in which a police officer’s 
search was apparently unconstitutional, one of the attorneys 
recognized the officer’s name from the database.  The Assistant 
District Attorney initially tried to offer a misdemeanor, but when 
confronted with the officer’s long history of misconduct, dismissed the 
case.91  As the database application rolls out onto the attorneys’ 
smartphones this winter, the Society is looking forward to even more 
examples of how its attorneys can fight for police accountability in the 
courts. 
Beyond being a resource for the Society’s trial attorneys, the 
database assists The Legal Aid Society’s Special Litigation Unit in 
identifying patterns of police behavior to support impact litigation.  
The database also supports the Society’s law reform efforts by having 
the capacity to field complex questions about geographic, procedural, 
technical, and individual patterns of misconduct often asked about by 
local politicians, academics, reporters, and community organizations 
in researching local police misconduct.92  It helps the Society truly 
fulfill its role as the public’s defender; it not only fights for each 
individual client’s rights in court, but for the communities’ rights in 
impact litigation, in City Hall, and in the press. 
 
 90  Pending criminal matter on file with author.  Details of the case cannot be 
disclosed as of the time of this writing. 
 91  Pending criminal matter on file with author.  Details of the case cannot be 
disclosed as of the time of this writing. 
 92  See, e.g., Steven Yoder, Officers Who Rape: The Police Brutality Chiefs Ignore, 
ALJAZEERA AM. (Jan. 19, 2016, 5:30 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/ 
2016/1/19/sexual-violence-the-brutality-that-police-chiefs-ignore.html (reporting 
that The Legal Aid Society supplied news and lawsuits of sexual assault allegations 
against NYPD officers).  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Legal Aid Society’s database dispossesses the governmental 
monopoly on police misconduct information and makes that 
information available to the people whose liberty depends on it.  The 
philosophy behind the database agrees with the Wolf Court’s 
observation in 1949 that the success of “internal discipline of the 
police” depends on the “eyes of an alert public opinion” and consistent 
enforcement.93  The current crisis regarding public confidence in the 
police94 and in the government’s ability to manage law enforcement as 
police powers, especially as the power expands with modern-day 
technology, is exacerbated by laws like section 50-a.  Police record 
secrecy undermines constitutional rights to confront officers but also 
courts’ constitutional duties as a “separate power” to serve our 
democracy by checking executive power. 
While defense attorneys will continue to push judges to take on 
their role to review and scrutinize the police in their courtrooms, we 
all must also push our legislators to strike the exemptions for police 
personnel records.  What The Legal Aid Society is doing will not 
replace legislative reform, no matter how large its database grows.  
Defender-driven data, while filling a gap in access to records, is not the 
ultimate solution.  Transparency in police records is a necessary step 
towards balancing the governing powers of the executive, deterring 
individual misconduct, and empowering communities to make 
informed assessments of local police department’s accountability 
system and to truly participate in a democratic process.95  Until then, 
the state, like its royal predecessor, is definitely not governing, but as 
Ta-Nehisi Coates observed, simply ruling. 
 
 
 93  Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).  See also supra note 72.  
 94  Graham Kates, The ‘Crisis of Confidence’ in Police-Community Relations, CRIME REP. 
(Sept. 6, 2014, 7:58 AM) http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/inside-criminal-
justice/2014-09-the-crisis-of-confidence-in-police-community-relatio; Eric T. 
Schneiderman, Ending the Crisis of Confidence in Our Criminal Justice System, HUFFPOST 
N.Y. (July 20, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-t-schneiderman/ending-
the-crisis-of-conf_b_7828304.html.  
 95  See Conti-Cook, supra note 43, for a national survey of public access laws 
alongside how these laws have been altered by legislation restricting access to body 
camera footage. 
